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AN IQ TEST FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES? JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT
UNDER THE APA
Margaret Pak
Abstract: The Information Quality Act (IQA) directs the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) to issue guidelines to federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the
quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information disseminated by the agencies. The
IQA directs agencies to develop administrative mechanisms whereby a person affected by
agency-disseminated information may request correction of information that the person
believes does not comply with the OMB's guidelines. The IQA is silent on whether judicial
review is available to challenge an agency's decision to deny a "request for correction"
(RFC). Regulated parties, legislators, scholars, and other groups have framed judicial review
of RFC decisions as either a necessary quality-control mechanism for agency rulemaking or
an antiregulatory effort to burden an agency's ability to promulgate rules. This Comment
argues that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) bars judicial review of an agency's
decision to deny an RFC under both of the APA exceptions to judicial review. Section
701(a)(1) of the APA bars judicial review because congressional intent to preclude judicial
review of an agency's RFC decision is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme of the IQA.
Section 701(a)(2) of the APA bars judicial review because an agency's RFC decision is
committed to agency discretion by law; neither the IQA nor the guidelines promulgated by
the OMB pursuant to the IQA provide any law to apply or any meaningful standards by
which to judge such agency action.
INTRODUCTION
In 2001, Congress passed the Information Quality Act (IQA), also
referred to as the Data Quality Act, to ensure and maximize the quality,
objectivity, utility, and integrity of information disseminated by the
federal government.t To this end, the IQA directs the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) to develop information quality
guidelines that direct federal agencies to (1) develop agency-specific
information quality guidelines based on the OMB's guidelines; (2)
create administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to request
and obtain correction of agency-disseminated information that does not
comply with the OMB's guidelines; and (3) report to the OMB Director
1. See Fiscal Year 2001 Consolidated Appropriations Act § 515(a), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114
Stat. 2763A-153 to 2763A-154 (to be codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3516). The IQA is also referred to as
the Data Quality Act. See, e.g., Agency Information Quality Guidelines,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/agency-info-quality-links.html (last visited June 28,
2005).
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periodically on the agency's administration of the information quality
guidelines.2 Critics of the IQA see the law as an industry-led effort to
enable interest groups either to force agencies to withdraw publicly
disseminated reports that influence environmental and public safety
regulations, 3 or to prevent agencies from creating regulations by
demanding that the government use only data that has reached "rare
level[s] of certainty."4 Proponents of the IQA see the law as a necessary
guard against the government's use of faulty information to create
unnecessary and costly laws that can exacerbate the problems being
addressed.5 The debate over the IQA reflects the ongoing tension
between regulatory decisions based on science and the inherent
uncertainty of science.6
Under the IQA, affected parties may challenge information
disseminated by a federal agency by filing a "request for correction"
(RFC) with that agency.7 Since Congress passed the IQA, various parties
have used the IQA's provision of administrative mechanisms to
challenge information disseminated by a federal agency.8 Examples of
specific RFCs include a challenge to a U.S. Environmental Protection
2. See Information Quality Act § 515(b)(2), 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 note (West Supp. 2004).
3. See, e.g., ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY
772 (4th ed. 2003) (noting that industry lobbyists took steps using IQA procedures to force
withdrawal of report on global warming even before statute went into effect (citing Andrew C.
Revkin, Law Revises Standards for Scientific Study, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at A30)).
4. See Rick Weiss, Data Quality Law is Nemesis of Regulation, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2004, at
Al.
5. See REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE, THE DATA QUALITY ACT: HISTORY AND PURPOSE 6(2005), http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/Jan 1 805DQAbackgrounderPG.pdf.
6. Compare John D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Protection Against Risk
at Less Cost, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 13, 41 (1997) (noting that because of "major implications" on
regulatory response, marketplace, and tort litigation, "[i]t is therefore important that the
government's risk-assessment determinations be based on sound scientific principles and
procedures"), with THOMAS 0. MCGARITY ET AL., SOPHISTICATED SABOTAGE: THE INTELLECTUAL
GAMES USED TO SUBVERT RESPONSIBLE REGULATION 32 (2004) (noting inherent limits of
scientific knowledge and that while it is "important for regulatory agencies to marshal the most
rigorous possible empirical evidence and scientific analysis, any regulatory decision ultimately
reflects certain ethical judgments, social priorities, and.., political values"). For a discussion of the
OMB and the IQA in the context of the "sound science" movement, see Michelle V. Lacko,
Comment, The Data Quality Act: Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy?, 53 EMORY L.J. 305, 313-18
(2004).
7. See OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, INFORMATION QUALITY: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 12 [hereinafter
A REPORT TO CONGRESS], http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/fy03_info quality-rpt.pdf (last
visited June 28, 2005).
8. See generally id. (listing requests for information by agency).
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Agency (EPA) manual on preventing asbestos disease among auto
mechanics, 9 and a challenge to a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
Biological Opinion used as the basis for a decision to list a species under
the Endangered Species Act.'
0
The availability of judicial review of an agency's final decision to
grant or deny an RFC is an unsettled question."' Litigants seeking
judicial review of federal agency action generally rely on two bases for
judicial review: a private right of action provided by a statute or a cause
of action provided by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 12 A
private right of action is available only where there is congressional
intent to provide this right, whether or not judicial review is compatible
with the statute.' 3 The APA serves as the statutory basis for judicial
review over agency actions where Congress has not provided this
specific statutory right.14 However, judicial review of an agency action
via an APA cause of action is barred in two instances.' 5 First, judicial
review is barred where it is precluded by statute.16 Second, judicial
review is barred to the extent that agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law" 7- because either there is no law to apply' 8 or because
there are no meaningful standards by which to judge agency action.' 9
Two district courts have addressed whether judicial review of the IQA
9. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INFORMATION QUALITY FY03 ANNUAL
REPORT 13-14, http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/documents[EPA-1QG-FY03-
AnnualReport.pdf (January 1, 2004).
10. See A REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 53-54.
11. See, e.g., John D. Graham, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, remarks at the
Ensuring the Quality of Data Disseminated by the Federal Government Workshop 9, (Mar. 21,
2002) ("Lawsuits against agencies are certainly another possibility .... My personal hope is that the
courts will stay out of the picture except in cases of egregious agency mismanagement. Yet it will
probably take a few critical court decisions before we know how this law and the associated
guidelines will be interpreted by judges.") (transcript available at
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/st/ 4 -2 1-02_Transcript.doc); REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE,
supra note 5, at 6 ("[T]he outstanding question of whether government actions, subject to the Data
Quality Act, can be reviewed in the courts is one that Congress may need to address in the future.").
12. Reg'l Mgmt. Corp. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 186 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 1999), cited in Salt Inst.
v. Thompson, 345 F. Supp. 2d 589, 601 (E.D. Va. 2004).
13. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001).
14. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000); Reg'lMgmt., 186 F.3d at 461.
15. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a).
16. Id. § 701(a)(1).
17. Id. § 701(a)(2).
18. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
19. See Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
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is available. 20 Both courts concluded that (1) the IQA does not expressly
or implicitly provide a private cause of action,21 and (2) judicial review
of an agency decision to grant or deny an RFC is not available via the
APA because such agency decisions are committed to agency discretion
by law under section 701(a)(2).22 Both cases, however, may have little
precedential value with respect to the IQA because both involved an
APA threshold issue such as exhaustion, standing, or final agency
23action.
This Comment argues that judicial review of an agency's decision to
grant or deny an RFC is barred under both of the APA exceptions to
judicial review.24 First, judicial review is barred under section 701(a)(1)
because congressional intent to preclude such review is fairly discernible
from the structure and objectives, and from the nature of the
administrative action of the IQA.25 Second, judicial review is barred
under section 701 (a)(2) because an agency's decision to grant or deny an
20. See In re Operation of the Missouri River Sys. Litigation, 363 F.Supp. 2d 1145, 1173-75 (D.
Minn. 2004); Salt Inst. v. Thompson, 345 F. Supp. 2d 589, 593-603 (E.D. Va. 2004).
21. See Missouri River, 363 F.Supp. 2d at 1174 (stating summarily that "[t]he IQA does not
provide for a private cause of action"); Salt Inst., 345 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (finding "nothing in the
IQA that provides a right of action").
22. See Missouri River, 363 F.Supp. 2d at 1 175(noting absence of any meaningful standard by
which to judge agency action); Salt Inst., 345 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (stating that "informal agency
decisions concerning [the agency's] statements and recommendations ... were matters 'committed
to agency discretion by law').
In Salt Institute v. Thompson, a salt trade association brought an IQA challenge against the
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute for failing to disclose data and methods underlying a
study on the effect of sodium on high blood pressure. Id. at 592-93. The government responded by
characterizing the report as an "informal agency statement" and therefore not a final agency action
judicially reviewable under the APA. Id. at 603.
23. In Missouri River, defendants argued that plaintiffs failed to exhaust the administrative
mechanisms provided by the IQA. See Federal Defendant's Opposition to Blaske Marine, Inc.'s
Motion for Summary Judgment for Declaration on Eleventh Claim, Information Quality Act at 11,
Missouri River (No. 8:03CV142), 363 F.Supp. 2d 1145 (D. Minn. 2004). In Salt Institute, although
the court reached the merits of the section 701(a)(2) argument, the court's holding rested on
threshold issues of standing, see Salt Inst., 345 F. Supp. at 600, and final agency action, see id. at
602.
24. The scope of this Comment is narrow; it addresses the specific agency action of deciding
whether to grant or deny an RFC and whether this gives rise to a cause of action under the IQA.
This Comment does not address whether constitutional or other statutory claims (including patent
abuse of agency discretion reviewable under 5 U.S.C. § 706) could be brought under the IQA.
Similarly, this Comment does not address the threshold issues of standing, final agency action, or
ripeness that may make judicial review of alleged IQA violations unreviewable.
25. See infra Part IlIl.A; 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (2000); Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S.
340, 351 (1984).
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RFC is committed to agency discretion by law.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the IQA. Part II
explains the APA as a statutory basis for judicial review and describes
the two APA exceptions under which APA judicial review is barred. Part
III argues that judicial review of an agency's RFC decision under the
APA is not available under both of the APA exceptions.
I. CONGRESS DELEGATED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IQA
TO THE OMB AND THE FEDERAL AGENCIES
In 2001, Congress passed the IQA as an amendment to the Paperwork
Reduction Act (PRA) of 2001.27 Pursuant to the IQA, the OMB issued
final implementing guidelines in February 2002.28 Over 130 federal
agencies have issued agency-specific information quality guidelines
pursuant to the OMB's guidelines.
29
A. Congress Passed the IQA in an Appropriations Rider and Left the
Key Terms of the IQA to Be Defined by the OMB
Congress passed the IQA as an amendment to the PRA by way of an
appropriations rider with no floor debate30 and little legislative history.
3
'
26. See infra Part II.B; 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
o 27. See Fiscal Year 2001 Consolidated Appropriations Act § 515(a), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114
Stat. 2763A-153 to 2763A-154 (to be codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3516).
28. See Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8452-60 
(Feb.
22, 2002) [hereinafter OMB Guidelines; Republication].
29. See Agency Information Quality Guidelines, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg
agencyjinfoqualitylinks.html (last visited June 28, 2005).
30. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT: OMB's
GUIDANCE AND INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION 2 (September 17, 2004), http://thecre.com/pdf/
20041021crs.pdf (noting that there were "no hearings or debates on this provision and no
committee reports were filed"); Sidney A. Shapiro, The Information Quality Act and Environmental
Protection: The Perils of Reform by Appropriations Rider, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. 339, 344-45 (2004) (noting that IQA "passed as a brief appropriations rider, without the
benefit of hearings or debate"); Rick Weiss, Data Quality Law is Nemesis of Regulation, WASH.
POST, Aug. 16, 2004, at Al ("It is not clear whether anyone in Congress other than [Rep. Jo Ann]
Emerson and Sen. Richard C. Shelby (R-Ala.) knew about the buried [rider] language.").
31. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 30, at 4 (noting "scant legislative
history of the IQA"). But see James W. Conrad, Jr., The Information Quality Act, Antiregulatory
Costs of Mythic Proportions?, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 521, 523 (2003) (noting that language of
IQA first appeared in 1998 House report on Shelby Amendment but was "little noticed at the
time"); REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 3 (stating that Data Quality Act
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The IQA directs the OMB to issue guidelines that provide policy and
procedural guidance to federal agencies in fulfilling the purposes and
provisions of the PRA.32 The guidelines must direct all applicable
federal agencies to (1) issue their own agency guidelines pursuant to the
statutory objectives in the IQA and in the OMB's guidelines; (2)
establish administrative mechanisms for RFCs; and (3) report
implementation of the agency's information quality guidelines to the
director of the OMB. 33 Congress did not define any of the key terms-
"quality," "objectivity," "utility," or "integrity"-in the IQA 34 or in the
PRA.
3 5
Congress enacted the PRA in 1980, but it originated from the Federal
Reports Act of 1942. In 1995, the PRA was substantially amended and
re-enacted in whole.37 The PRA of 1995 created the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs within the OMB to oversee agency
reaffirmed data quality provisions contained in Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995).
32. Information Quality Act § 515(a), 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 note (West Supp. 2004).
33. See Information Quality Act § 515(b)(2), 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 note (West Supp. 2004).
34. In its entirety, the IQA states:
(a) In general. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall, by not later thanSeptember 30, 2001, and with public and Federal agency involvement, issue guidelines under
sections 3504(d)(1) and 3516 of title 44, United States Code, that provide policy andprocedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity,
utility, and integrity of information (including statistical information) disseminated by Federal
agencies in fulfillment of the purposes and provisions of chapter 35 of title 44, United StatesCode, commonly referred to as the Paperwork Reduction Act.
(b) Content of guidelines. The guidelines under subsection (a) shall-
(1) apply to the sharing by Federal agencies of, and access to, information disseminated by
Federal agencies; and
(2) require that each Federal agency to which the guidelines apply-
(A) issue guidelines ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity
of information (including statistical information) disseminated by the agency, by not later
than 1 year after the date of issuance of the guidelines under subsection (a);
(B) establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and obtain
correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency that does not
comply with the guidelines issued under subsection (a); and
(C) report periodically to the Director-
(i) the number and nature of complaints received by the agency regarding the accuracy
of information disseminated by the agency; and
(ii) how such complaints were handled by the agency.
Information Quality Act § 515, 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 note (West Supp. 2004).
35. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502 (2000) ("Definitions").
36. See Federal Reports Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 1078; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Paperwork Redux: The(Stronger) Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 49 ADMtN. L. REv. 111, 111 (1997).
37. See Lubbers, supra note 36, at 112.
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resources management.38 The purposes of the PRA include establishing
information policies that minimize paperwork burdens on the public and
the government; 39 ensuring the greatest possible public benefit from the
federal government's creation, use, and dissemination of 
information; 40
coordinating federal information policy; 4 and improving the quality and
use of federal information to strengthen decision-making, accountability,
and openness in government. 42 With respect to general information
resources management, the PRA directs federal agencies to manage
information resources to (1) reduce information collection burdens on
the public, (2) increase program efficiency and effectiveness, and (3)
improve the integrity, quality, and utility of information to all users43
within and outside the agency.
B. The OMB Guidelines Implementing the IQA Define the Key Terms
of the IQA and Emphasize Flexibility and Agency Discretion
The OMB issued final implementing guidelines (OMB Guidelines)
pursuant to the IQA in February 2002.44 The OMB Guidelines direct
federal agencies to implement procedures to ensure and maximize a
basic level of quality for information those agencies disseminate.
45
Specifically, agencies must (1) prepare information quality guidelines
that contain specific quality standards appropriate to the agency and the
type of information being disseminated;46 (2) develop a process for
reviewing the quality of information before it is disseminated;
47 (3)
38. See id.
39. See 44 U.S.C. § 3501(1), (5) (2000).
40. See id. § 3501(2).
41. See id. § 3501(3), (6), (10)-(11).
42. See id. § 3501(4).
43. Id. § 3506(b)(I)(A)-(C).
44. See OMB Guidelines; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8452-58 ("Supplementary
Information") and 8458-60 ("Guidelines") (Feb. 22, 2002).
On January 3, 2002, the OMB published guidelines in final form. See Guidelines for Ensuring
and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by
Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 369 (Jan. 3, 2002). Due to a number of minor errors, however, a
corrected version of the final guidelines was republished in its entirety on February 22, 2002. See
OMB Guidelines; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8452.
45. OMB Guidelines; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8452.
46. Id. at 8458-59.
47. Id. at 8459.
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establish administrative mechanisms for public review;48 and (4) submit
an annual report to the OMB providing information on the number,
nature, and resolution of RFCs. 4 9
The OMB relied on three principles in drafting the OMB Guidelines:(1) flexibility to accommodate specific agency information resource
management and administrative practices;50  (2) variable levels of
information quality based on the agency's determination of costs and
benefits of such levels;51 and (3) common-sense implementation by
agencies. The OMB stated that its issuance of the final OMB
Guidelines marked the "beginning of an evolutionary process" that
anticipates increasing experience with OMB and agency guidelines and
continuing refinement of both OMB and agency guidelines.53
The OMB Guidelines define the key substantive terms of the IQA 54 -
"quality," "utility," "objectivity," and "integrity"-that the IQA itself
does not define.55  The OMB Guidelines define "quality" as
encompassing the terms "utility," "objectivity," and "integrity., 56 The
OMB Guidelines define "utility" as the uses of information and the
usefulness of information to its intended users.57 According to the OMB
Guidelines, the purpose of the "integrity" standard is to ensure that
information is not compromised through corruption or falsification. 8
The OMB Guidelines define "objectivity" with the most detail.59 The
"objectivity" standard states that "[i]n a scientific, financial, or statistical
context, the original and supporting data shall be generated, and the
analytic results shall be developed, using sound statistical and research
methods." 6
0
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 8452.
51. Id. at 8452-53.
52. Id. at 8453.
53. Id. at 8458.
54. See id. at 8453 (noting "four substantive terms").
55. See id. at 8459-60 ("Definitions"); supra note 34 and accompanying text.
56. OMB Guidelines; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8459.
57. See id. (stating that "utility" requires agency to consider uses of information from perspective
of public in addition to that of agency):
58. Id. at 8460.
59. See id. at 8459-60 (defining "objectivity" in more length than other defined terms).
60. Id. at 8459. The OMB Guidelines do not define the phrase "sound statistical and research
methods."
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Although the OMB Guidelines define the key substantive terms of the
IQA with some detail,61 they grant agencies wide discretion in
establishing administrative mechanisms. 62 The OMB Guidelines direct
agencies to establish administrative mechanisms that allow affected
persons to seek and obtain, "where appropriate," timely correction of
information that does not comply with OMB or agency guidelines.63 In
the preface to the OMB Guidelines, the OMB states that the
administrative mechanisms should be appropriate to the nature and
timeliness of the agency-disseminated information. 64 Further, the OMB
explains that in determining whether to correct information, agencies
"may reject claims made in bad faith or without justification, and are
required to undertake only the degree of correction that they conclude is
appropriate for the nature and timeliness of the information
involved .... ,65
C. Information Quality Guidelines Issued by Departments, Agencies,
and Sub-Agencies Pursuant to the IQA and OMB Guidelines
Likewise Emphasize Flexibility and Agency Discretion
Over 130 departments, agencies, and sub-agencies have issued
information quality guidelines pursuant to the OMB Guidelines. 66 These
agency guidelines specify procedures that complainants must comply
with in order to challenge the agency's dissemination of information in
administrative hearings.67 These procedural requirements include time
limits on agency responses to RFCs, information required from RFC68
petitioners, and an appeals process to challenge initial RFC decisions.
For example, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
Final Guidelines instruct complainants to provide a detailed description
61. See id. at 8453 ("It is not always clear how each substantive term relates... to the widely
divergent types of information that agencies disseminate.").
62. See id. at 8459 (directing that "administrative mechanisms shall be flexible" and that
corrections to information be made "where appropriate").
63. See id. (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 8458.
65. See id.; see also A REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that although scope of
OMB Guidelines is broad, "OMB also provided agencies discretion to reject correction requests that
are groundless or made in bad faith, or boil down to a difference of opinion").
66. See Agency Information Quality Guidelines, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
agencyinfo-qualitylinks.html (last visited May 12, 2005).
67. See OMB Guidelines; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8459.
68. See id.
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of the information being challenged; specific reasons why the
complainant believes such information does not comply with the OMB
Guidelines, HHS guidelines, or agency-specific guidelines; specific
recommendations on how to correct the information; a description of
how the complainant is affected by the information error; and contact
information (including organizational affiliation) for the complainant. 69
Generally, agency guidelines are consistent with the OMB's
discretionary language regarding an agency's decision to grant or deny
an RFC.70 For example, the EPA's Information Quality Guidelines state
that "considerations relevant to the determination of appropriate
corrective action include the nature and timeliness of the information
involved and such factors as the significance of the error on the use of
information and the magnitude of error.",71 The Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC) Information Quality Guidelines similarly
state that "[t]he CPSC is required to undertake only the degree of
correction that it concludes is appropriate for the nature and timeliness
of the information involved.72 Although not legally dispositive,73 some
information quality guidelines expressly state that the guidelines do not
provide a right to judicial review.74
69. See Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by HHS Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 61343 (Sept. 30, 2002) (announcing
availability of HHS Information Quality Guidelines on HHS Web site); HHS Information Quality
Guidelines, http://www.hhs.gov/infoquality/partl.html#e.
70. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 30, at 4 (noting that OMB's guidance
in interpreting key provisions of IQA has had major effect on implementation of IQA).
71. See Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by the Environmental Protection Agency, 67 Fed. Reg. 63657 (Oct. 15,
2002) (announcing availability of EPA Information Quality Guidelines on EPA Web site); EPA
Information Quality Guidelines 35 (emphasis added), http://www.epa.gov/quality/
informationguidelines/documents/EPAInfoQualityGuidelines.pdf.
72. See Consumer Product Safety Commission Information Quality Guidelines (emphasis added),
http://www.cpsc.gov/LlBRARY/infoguidelines.htm] (last visited June 28, 2005).
73. See, e.g., De Jesus Ramirez v. Reich, 156 F.3d 1273, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that only
statutes, not agency regulations, can preclude judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)).
74. See, e.g., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Information Quality Guidelines 8,
http://informationquality.fws.gov/topics/FWS%201nformation%2OQuality%2OGuidelines.pdf (last
visited June 28, 2005) (stating that guidelines are "intended only to improve the internal
management of the FWS relating to information quality" and "do not provide any right to judicial
review").
740
Judicial Review of the IQA
II. THE APA PROVIDES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY
ACTION WITH TWO EXCEPTIONS
The APA serves as the basis for judicial review of final agency action
where a statute does not confer a private cause of action.75 There are two
exceptions to APA judicial review.76 First, judicial review under the
APA is barred where judicial review is precluded by statute." Second,
judicial review is barred where agency decisions are committed to
agency discretion by law.78
A. The APA Is a Statutory Basis for Judicial Review
The APA governs federal agencies' decision-making procedures.79
The APA serves as the basis for judicial review of final agency action
for which Congress has not expressly provided a statutory right to
judicial review. 80 In enacting the APA, Congress recognized the need to
balance the goal of efficient and effective agency action with the goal of
ensuring rationality and fairness in agency decision-making.
8
'
Section 704 of the APA provides for judicial review of final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy.82 APA review is
available to any person suffering a legal wrong due to agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute.83 The APA defines "agency
action" to "include the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license,
sanction, or relief, or the equivalent denial thereof or failure to act." 84 An
75. See Reg'l Mgmt. Corp. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 186 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 1999).
76. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2000).
77. Id. § 701(a)(1).
78. Id. § 701(a)(2).
79. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-583, 701-706, 801-808, 3105, 3344, 6362, 7562.
80. See id. §§ 701-706; Reg'l Mgmt., 186 F.3d at 461.
81. See Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth Anniversary
of the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park's Requirement of Judicial
Review "On the Record, " 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179, 181 (1996) (noting that opposing impulses of
desire for broad agency discretion and yearning for vigorous judicial review of agency action has
led to conflicted and vague doctrinal formulations of judicial review of agency action); see also
STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 984 (5th ed. 2002)
("[T]he APA was a compromise between New Deal enthusiasts hostile to control of administrative
action and skeptics who saw judicial control as an indispensable safeguard of rule of law values.").
82. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
83. /d. § 702.
84. Id. § 551(13). But see Indus. Safety Equip. Ass'n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1117 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (noting that definition of "agency action" set forth by APA is "imprecise, and courts have
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agency action is "final" if the action marks the consummation of the
agency's decision-making process and if the action is one by which legal
rights or obligations have been determined.85 Upon judicial review, a
court may compel agency action unlawfully withheld or hold unlawful
and set aside agency findings and conclusions under six different
standards of review.8
6
The availability of review of final agency action depends heavily on
the type of claim the petitioner raises,87 the basis upon which the
petitioner alleges unlawfulness, 88 and the agency and agency decision
involved.89 For example, a court is more likely to review a claim against
an agency that involves a constitutional issue.90 Whether the petitioner
claims that the agency made an erroneous finding of fact, violated its
own regulations, or wrongly applied a statute to a particular set of facts
will also influence the avaiiability of judicial review.91
Two decades after Congress passed the APA, the U.S. Supreme Court
interpreted the APA as reinforcing or embodying "the basic presumption
of judicial review" over agency action.92 Perhaps out of constitutional
concerns, 93 courts have long exercised judicial review over unauthorized
agency action that infringes on individual rights.94 The presumption of
reviewability may be rebutted by evidence of congressional intent to bar
judicial review. 95 The U.S. Supreme Court and legal scholars, however,
made the threshold determination of reviewable agency action on a case-by-case basis").
85. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).
86. See id. § 706(l)-(2).
87. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 81, at 985.
88. See id.
89. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970) (noting great
difference between administrative agencies in respect to ."the extent to which, and the procedures
by which, different measures of control afford judicial review of administrative action"' (quoting
Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288,312 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
90. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (noting "heightened showing" of
congressional intent required to limit judicial review over constitutional claims).
91. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 81, at 985-86.
92. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
93. See Shalala v. I11. Council on Long Term Care, 529 U.S. 1, 44 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(noting that constitutional structure contemplates judicial review as check on administrative action).
94. See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) ("[U]nder Article II, Congress established
courts to adjudicate.., claims of infringement of individual rights whether by unlawful action of
private persons or the exertion of unauthorized administrative power."). Cf. BREYER ET AL., supra
note 81, at 984 (noting that American courts started recognizing presumption of reviewability in
1960s).
95. See Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984).
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have noted that courts have relaxed the presumption of reviewability in
recent case law.
96
B. The APA Provides Two Exceptions to Judicial Review
The APA codifies two instances where the presumption of judicial
review does not apply: where the "statute precludes judicial review" or
where "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."1
97
Section 701(a)(1) of the APA bars judicial review where congressional
intent to preclude judicial review is "fairly discernible" in a statutory
scheme.98 Section 701(a)(2) bars judicial review where agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law because there is "no law to
apply." 99 The legal analyses applying sections 701(a)(1) and 701(a)(2),
however, are not always clearly distinct.'00
1. Judicial Review Is Not Available Under the APA Where Such
Review Is Precluded by Statute
If not explicit, statutory preclusion of judicial review may be
implicit.'0 l Courts have found implicit preclusion in a number of
96. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190-91 (1994) ("[a basic presumption of judicial review]
is 'just' a presumption" (citing Block, 467 U.S. at 349)); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE 1281 (4th Ed. 2002) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court has continued to gradually
reduce scope and strength of presumption of reviewability); BREYER ET AL., supra note 81, at 983
(noting that although courts have recognized presumption of reviewability since 1960s, presumption
"has been weakened a bit" since 1990s).
97. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)-(2) (2000); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985)
(noting that if party overcomes hurdles of section 701(a) then all final agency action for which there
is no other adequate remedy in court is reviewable under APA).
98. See Block, 467 U.S. at 351.
99. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). There is also
a line of case law under section 701 (a)(2) that precludes APA judicial review where, by tradition,
agency decisions are committed to agency discretion by law. See infra note 131.
100. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 828 (1985) ("[I]ndeed, one might wonder what difference exists
between § (a)(1) and § (a)(2)."); BREYER ET AL., supra note 81, at 1002 ("[T]he line between
implicit [statutory] preclusion of review and commitment to agency discretion may be thin.");
PIERCE, supra note 96, at 1303 (noting that in many cases where Congress has neither explicitly
provided nor barred review of agency action, "the analysis under APA § 701(a)(1) is
indistinguishable froni the analysis under APA § 701(a)(2)").
101. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165 (1970) ("Whether agency action is reviewable
often poses difficult questions of congressional intent; and the Court must decide if Congress has in
express or implied terms precluded judicial review or committed the challenged action entirely to
administrative discretion.").
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instances.10 2 Congressional intent is the key factor in determining
whether the section 701(a)(1) exception to APA review applies. 0 3
Congress may implicitly preclude judicial review of agency action
where congressional intent to do so is "fairly discernible" in the statutory
scheme. 10 4 The U.S. Supreme Court, borrowing language from the
legislative history of the APA, 0 5 stated that absent a showing of "clear
and convincing evidence" of contrary legislative intent, courts should
not restrict access to judicial review under section 701(a)(1).'16 The
Court has since explained that the "clear and convincing evidence"
standard should not be used in a strict evidentiary sense. 10 7
In Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,10 8 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that Congress implicitly precluded judicial review of consumer
suits brought under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
(AMAA).' 09 The Court found evidence of congressional intent to
102. See, e.g., United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444, 447 (1988) (relying on purpose,
"entirety of its text," and structure of review established in Civil Service Reform Act to imply
congressional intent to preclude judicial review of claims brought by non-preference employees
under Act); United States v. Erika, 456 U.S. 201, 206, 211 (1982) (relying on statutory language,
legislative history, and subsequent amendments to Medicare statute to find congressional intent to
preclude judicial review of adverse Medicare payment determinations in Court of Claims).
103. See Block, 467 U.S. at 345 (noting that whether particular statute precludes judicial review is
determined by congressional intent); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) (noting
that section 701(a)(1) exception applies where Congress has expressed intent to preclude review and
section 701(a)(2) can apply even where Congress has not affirmatively barred review).
104. See Block, 467 U.S. at 351. However, Block also notes that where "substantial doubt" about
congressional intent exists, a general presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action
is controlling. Id.
105. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 n.2 (1967) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 79-1980,
at 41 (1946)).
106. See id. at 140-41. Scholars have noted the U.S. courts of appeals' difficulty applying the
U.S. Supreme Court precedent on implicit preclusion. See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL.,
GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 1199 (10th ed. 2003)
("[C]ourts of appeals have responded to the uncomfortable pair of [U.S. Supreme Court] cases by
either.., emphasizing [Block v.] CNI when finding preclusion [or Bowen v.] Michigan Academy
when finding reviewability.").
107. See Block, 467 U.S. at 351.
108. 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
109. See id. at 352-53. In reversing the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, the Block Court held that the suit was precluded under the section 701(a)(l) exception to
APA review. See id. at 345. Although the Court expressly noted that it did not reach the standing
issue, see id. at 353 n.4, a number of scholars understand Block to be a case about standing, not
preclusion. See. e.g., PIERCE, supra note 96, at 1270 (claiming that Block Court "held that
consumers lacked standing" to obtain judicial review); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 263-64 (1988) (claiming that Block Court "denied standing to
consumers to challenge a marketing order").
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preclude judicial review of consumer suits in the AMAA's statutory
structure and objectives, and in the nature of the administrative action
involved. 10 The Court stated that the presumption of judicial review
under the APA "may be overcome by specific language or specific
legislative history that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent.""'
In the absence of express statutory language, whether Congress intended
a particular statute to preclude judicial review under section 701(a)(1)
can be inferred by "the statutory scheme as a whole." ' 1 2 The "statutory
scheme as a whole" includes the structure, objectives, and legislative
history of the statute, and the nature of administration action involved." 3
In looking to the statutory structure of the AMAA, the Block Court
applied the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius-"to express or
include one thing implies the exclusion of the other"'l 4 -to find
evidence of congressional intent to preclude judicial review. 115 In
applying this canon, the Court relied on the absence of statutory
language providing judicial review for dairy consumers in the AMAA
coupled with the statutory language providing judicial review for dairy
handlers. 16 The AMAA allows dairy handlers to seek judicial review
after they have exhausted the administrative remedies available under
the Act, but is silent on whether consumers can participate in any
proceeding under the Act. 1 7 However, the Block Court did not rely
solely on the expressio unius canon to preclude judicial review,1 18 nor
110. See Block, 467 U.S. at 352.
111. See id. at 349.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 345.
114. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004).
115. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 81, at 993 (noting Block Court's principle use of canon
expressio unius est exclusio alterius but that use of such canon "can be a hazardous guide to
interpretation"). The Block Court did not expressly state that it was relying on the expressio unius
canon; however, the Court's analysis is congruent with the canon. See, e.g., Block, 467 U.S. at 347
("Nowhere in the Act, however, is there an express provision for participation by consumers in any
proceeding. In a complex scheme of this type, the omission of such a provision is sufficient reason
to believe that Congress intended to foreclose consumer participation in the regulatory process.").
116. See Block, 467 U.S. at 346-47 ("In a complex scheme of this type, the omission of such a
provision is sufficient reason to believe that Congress intended to foreclose consumer participation
in the regulatory process.").
117. See id. at 346.
118. See id. at 346-48 (applying expressio unius canon and relying on objectives of statute and
provision of administrative remedies in statute as further evidence of congressional intent to
preclude review); see also United States v. Erika, 456 U.S. 201, 208-09 (1982) (applying expressio
unius canon and relying on legislative history and subsequent amendments of statute as further
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did the Court extend the canon to bar any constitutional or statutory
claims. 119
For further evidence of congressional intent to preclude judicial
review, the Block Court looked to the objectives of the AMAA. 120 The
primary objective of the AMAA was to control the "destabilizing
competition" among dairy farmers by authorizing a market order scheme
setting minimum prices that dairy handlers must pay to dairy
producers. 121 The purpose of the market order scheme was to raise the
prices received by dairy producers and handlers. 122 The Court concluded
that permitting consumer suits could possibly frustrate the statutory
purpose and threaten the fundamental objectives of the AMAA.123 The
Court also noted that the preclusion of consumer suits would not
threaten the objectives of the AMAA 124 and held that the objectives of
the AMAA must be realized through the specific remedies already
provided by Congress.1
25
In addition to the statutory structure and objectives of the AMAA, the
Block Court considered the nature of the administrative action involved
in the AMAA-namely the statute's provision for administrative
remedies and judicial review for dairy handlers-as evidence of
congressional intent to preclude judicial review for consumer suits. 126
The AMAA requires handlers to exhaust administrative remedies made
available by the Secretary of Agriculture before seeking judicial review
in federal district court. 127 The Court concluded that allowing consumer
evidence of congressional intent to preclude review); Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 506 n.22
(1977) (noting that existence of express preclusion of judicial review in one section of statute is
relevant factor, but not conclusive, in determining whether there is congressional intent to preclude
judicial review in another section of statute).
119. See Block, 467 U.S. 340; see also Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S.
667, 678 (1986) (noting that in light of Congress' provision for review of claims that were
characterized as trivial, it is not likely that Congress intended that there be no review to challenge
legislation on statutory or constitutional grounds); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988)
(noting "heightened showing" of congressional intent required to preclude judicial review over
constitutional claims).
120. See Block, 467 U.S. at 347.
121. See id. at 341-42.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 352.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 352-53.
126. See id. at 346.
127. Id.
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suits would provide a mechanism that would frustrate Congress's
scheme and preference for administrative remedies for dairy handlers.
128
The Court noted that if consumer suits were allowed, handlers could
bypass the congressionally provided exhaustion requirement for handlers
by either joining suit with a consumer or bringing suit in their capacity
as a consumer. 129 Allowing judicial review for consumer suits under the
AMAA would have effectively mooted the administrative remedies
Congress provided for dairy handlers.1
30
2. Judicial Review Is Not Available Under the APA Where Agency
Action Is Committed to Agency Discretion by Law
Under the section 701(a)(2) exception to APA review, 131 judicial
review is barred where action is committed to agency discretion by
law. 132 In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,' 33 the U.S.
Supreme Court used language from the APA legislative history to
conclude that section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review "in those rare
instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given
case there is no law to apply.""'134 In Heckler v. Chaney,'35 the Court
added to Overton Park's "no law to apply" test, stating that section
701(a)(2) precludes judicial review where there are no judicially
manageable standards for judging how and when an agency should
exercise its discretion.
36
128. See id. at 352.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 351-52.
131. Interpretations of section 701(a)(2) have diverged into two lines of case law. See, e.g.,
BREYER ET AL., supra note 81, at 1002 (noting that there are two independent tests under section
701(a)(2) exception to judicial review--one that looks for legal standards in statute by which to
review claim, and one that looks for legal standards but also considers prudential factors leaning
towards unreviewability). Section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review of certain classes of agency
action that have traditionally been recognized as "committed to agency discretion by law,"
including prosecutorial decisions, see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830-31 (1985), an agency's
refusal to reopen an administrative proceeding because of material error, see Interstate Commerce
Comm'n v. Bd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282 (1987), and allocation of lump-sum
appropriations, see Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993).
132. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000).
133. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
134. See id. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945)). But see PIERCE, supra note 96, at
1262 (noting that U.S. courts of appeals have held number of statutes to be drawn so broadly that
there is no law to apply).
135. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
136. See id. at 830.
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The presence or absence of "law to apply" under section 701(a)(2) is
controlled by the language of the statute at issue1 37 and regulations
issued pursuant to the statute. 138 Because the prevailing consideration is
the language of the statute or pursuant regulations, courts evaluate the
existence of meaningful standards on a case-by-case basis. 39 Scholars
note that the "no law to apply" standard is difficult to apply. 140 Courts
have reached conflicting interpretations in their search for standards by
which to review agency actions. 14 1
In Overton Park, the Supreme Court held that the language of the
Federal-Aid Highway Act (FAHA) and the Department of
Transportation Act of 1966 (DTA) provided "law to apply" and
therefore that judicial review was not barred under section 701(a)(2) of
the APA.142 The petitioners in Overton Park alleged that the Secretary of
Transportation violated the FAHA and the DTA by authorizing the use
of federal funds to construct a six-lane highway through a public park in
Memphis, Tennessee. 43 The FAHA and the DTA prohibited the use of
federal funds to construct highways through parks unless there was "'no
137. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410; Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1998) ("Both
Overton Park and Heckler emphasized that § 701(a)(2) requires careful examination of the statute
on which the claim of agency illegality is based .... ).
138. See, e.g., Inova Alexandria Hosp. v. Shalala, 244 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that
"even if the underlying statute does not include meaningful (or manageable) standards, 'regulations
promulgated by an administrative agency in carrying out its statutory mandate can provide standards
for judicial review"' (quoting C.C. Distribs., Inc v. United States, 883 F.2d 146, 154 (D.C. Cir.
1989)))! McAlpine v. United States, 112 F.3d 1429, 1433 (10th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that "law to
apply" can be derived from agency's regulations); Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1123-
24, 1127 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding no meaningful standards to apply in statute,
coordinating/implementing regulation, or agency-specific regulation).
139. See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411 (holding that "feasible and prudent" and "minimize
harm" standards provided law to apply); Colo. Envtl. Coalition v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1234
(10th Cir. 2004) (stating that "fair balance" requirement in regulation was reviewable); Helgeson v.
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 153 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that phrases "judgment of
the Secretary" and "opinion of the Secretary" and structure of statute barred judicial review under
APA); Dickson v. Sec'y of Def., 68 F.3d 1396, 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that "in the interest
of justice" is meaningful standard); W. Med. Enters. v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that "good cause" standard provides law to apply).
140. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 96, at 1261 (noting that standard is difficult to apply).
141. Compare Abdelhamid v. llchert, 774 F.2d 1447, 1450-51 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that there
is no judicial review of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) because statute contained no judicially manageable
standards to apply), with Chong v. United States Info. Agency, 821 F.2d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 1987)
(acknowledging that its finding that agency regulation, 22 C.F.R. § 514.31(b)(2), implementing 8
U.S.C. § 1182(e), contains sufficient guidelines for judicial review, is in conflict with Abdelhamid).
142. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413.
143. Id. at 406.
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feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land"' and "'such
program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such
park... resulting from such use.",'14 4 The Court rejected both the
government's statutory preclusion argument and its "committed to
agency discretion by law" argument.1 45 The Court determined that the
language of the statute provided law to apply because the language
supplied "clear and specific directives" and in "plain and explicit" terms
barred the use of federal funds to construct highways through parks
absent unusual circumstances.146 Thus, the Court held that the FAHA
and DTA directives presented law to apply and that "the Secretary
cannot approve the destruction of parkland unless he finds that
alternative routes present unique problems."'
' 47
In contrast to Overton Park, the U.S. Supreme Court in Webster v.
Doe' 48 applied section 701(a)(2) to find that the structure and language
of the National Security Act (NSA) indicated congressional intent to
preclude judicial review of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Director's employment decisions. 49 Section 102 of the NSA provided
that the CIA Director "may, in his discretion, terminate the employment
of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such
termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United
States.. ,,."0 The Court emphasized the word "deem" in determining
that the standard in section 102 foreclosed any meaningful judicial
standard by which to judge the Director's decision.1 51 The Court noted,
after concluding that the language of section 102 "strongly suggests that
its implementation was 'committed to agency discretion by law,"' 52 that
the overall structure of the NSA also supported the Court's
conclusion.
53
144. See id. at 405 n.3 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1964 Supp. V)).
145. See id. at 410.
146. See id. at411.
147. See id. at 413.
148. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
149. See id. at 599-601 (relying on "no law to apply" in Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410, and "no
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion" in Heckler, 470
U.S. at 830).
150. See Webster, 486 U.S. at 594 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1947)).
151. See id. at 600 ("This standard ['shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the
interests of the United States'] fairly exudes deference to the Director, and appears to us to foreclose
the application of any meaningful judicial standard of review.").
152. See id. at 600 (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830).
153. See id. (noting that goal of ensuring integrity in CIA depends in large part on trustworthiness
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In Steenholdt v. Federal Aviation Administration,154 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the phrase "considers appropriate"
in section 44702(d)(2) of the Federal Aviation Act (FA Act) was a clear
sign to commit agency decision-making to agency discretion. 155 Under
section 44702(d)(2), the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) is authorized to appoint a private individual,
called a Designated Engineering Representative (DER), to perform FAA
compliance inspections on aircraft. 56 The Administrator may rescind a
DER designation "at any time for any reason the Administrator
considers appropriate."1 57 The petitioner in Steenholdt was challenging
the FAA's decision not to renew his DER status. 158 The court held that
the agency's decision to designate renewal/nonrenewal status was
committed to agency discretion,159 and barred judicial review of both the
substance and procedure of the Administrator's renewal/nonrenewal
decision. 16
0
In sum, there are two statutory bases for barring judicial review under
section 701 of the APA. First, judicial review is implicitly precluded
under section 701(a)(1) where congressional intent to bar review, as
evidenced through a statute's structure, objectives, and preference for
certain administrative remedies, is "fairly discernible" in the statutory
scheme as a whole. Second, judicial review is barred under section
701 (a)(2) where the language of a statute provides no "law to apply." In
cases where a statute describes the agency's decision with language such
as "deem" or "considers appropriate," courts have found neither "law to
apply" nor "judicially manageable standards" by which to judge final
of its employees and that Director's determination of employee's trustworthiness is barred fromjudicial review under APA). But see Dickson v. Sec'y of Def., 68 F.3d 1396, 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1995)(refusing to apply Webster, despite similar statutory language, on basis that NSA is "substantially
different" from statute authorizing correction boards).
154. 314 F.3d 633 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
155. See id. at 638; see also Salt Inst. v. Thompson, 345 F. Supp. 2d 589, 602-03 (E.D. Va. 2004)(pointing out similar discretionary language in FA Act in Steenholdt, IQA, and OMB guidelines);
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 34, Salt Inst., 345 F. Supp. 2d 589(No. 04-CV-359 GBL) (pointing out similar discretionary language in FA Act in Steenholdt and
OMB guidelines).
156. See Steenholdt, 314 F.3d. at 634-35.
157. See id. at 638.
158. See id. at 637-38.
159. See id. at 638.
160. See id. (supporting govemment's argument that "substance and procedure of that decision
are committed to agency discretion by law" and noting that among factors that agency used to base
its DER renewal decision were integrity, sound judgment, and quality of submittals).
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agency action.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AN AGENCY'S RFC DECISION IS
BARRED UNDER BOTH APA EXCEPTIONS
Judicial review of an agency's decision to grant or deny an RFC is not
available under either of the section 701 (a) exceptions to APA review.
161
First, section 701 (a)(1) bars judicial review because congressional intent
to preclude judicial review is "fairly discernible" in the statutory scheme
of the IQA.162 Second, section 701 (a)(2) bars judicial review because the
IQA and its subsequent guidelines provide no law to apply and no
meaningful standard by which to evaluate an agency's exercise of
discretion. 163
A. Judicial Review of an Agency's Decision to Grant or Deny an RFC
Is Barred Under Section 701 (a)(]) of the APA Because Such
Review Is Implicitly Precluded by Statute
Applying the implicit preclusion analysis used in Block, congressional
intent to preclude judicial review of RFC decisions under section
701(a)(1) of the APA is "fairly discernible" in the IQA's statutory
scheme as a whole: the IQA's structure and objectives, and the nature of
the administrative action involved. 164 The text of the IQA does not
explicitly preclude judicial review. 165 With only sparse legislative
history,166 courts must use the structure and objectives in the IQA, and
the nature of the administrative action involved, to determine whether
there is a "fairly discernible" congressional intent to preclude judicial
review of RFC decisions.
167
Courts should infer congressional intent to preclude judicial review of
an agency's decision to grant or deny an RFC from the structure of the
161. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2000). This Comment discusses the narrow question of whether the
APA provides a cause of action to review an agency's final refusal to grant an RFC. This analysis
begins on the presumption that the threshold issues of standing, final agency action, exhaustion, and
ripeness have been satisfied.
162. See supra Part II.B.1
163. See supra Part II.B.2.
164. See Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345, 349 (applying these elements to
preclude judicial review).
165. See Information Quality Act § 515, 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 note (West Supp. 2004).
166. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 30, at 2.
167. See Block, 467 U.S. at 345-46.
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IQA. 168 Courts should apply the expressio unius canon, as the Block
Court did in its implicit preclusion analysis. 69 The IQA's explicit
provision of administrative mechanisms to address RFCs and the
absence of any provision for judicial review provide evidence of
congressional intent to preclude judicial review of decisions to grant or
deny an RFC. 70 The IQA is silent on judicial review of an agency's
decision and specifically authorizes only administrative mechanisms to
challenge RFC decisions.171
The objectives of the IQA and the PRA-and the likely frustration of
these objectives if judicial review were allowed-provide further
evidence of congressional intent to preclude judicial review of agency
decisions to grant or deny an RFC.172 The objective of the IQA is to
ensure and maximize the quality of information disseminated by federal
agencies in fulfillment of the purposes and provisions of the PRA.173 The
IQA gives the OMB the responsibility of providing policy and
procedural guidance to federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the
quality of information. ]74 Judicial oversight of agency decisions to grant
or deny RFCs would frustrate the three principles of the OMB
Guidelines. 175 The principles of the OMB Guidelines recognize the
agency's expertise in (1) determining their own specific information
resource management and administrative practices, 76 (2) weighing costs
and benefits to determine varying levels of quality for different types ofinformation, 1 7 and (3) implementing the guidelines in a common-sense
and workable manner conducive to existing agency practices. 178 Judicial
review of RFC decisions may serve some of the purposes of the PRA,
such as improving the quality of federal information to strengthen
168. See id. at 347.
169. See Block, 467 U.S. at 347; BREYER ET AL., supra note 81, at 993; supra note 115.
170. See Block, 467 U.S. at 347.
171. See Information Quality Act § 515(b), 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 note (West Supp. 2004). ThisComment does not argue that the expressio unius canon extends to any constitutional or statutory
claims that could be brought under the IQA. See supra notes 24, 90.
172. See Block, 467 U.S. at 347.
173. See Information Quality Act § 515(a), 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 note.
174. See id.
175. See OMB Guidelines; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452-53 (Feb. 22, 2002).
176. See id. at 8452 (discussing "flexibility").
177. See id. at 8452-53 ("The guidelines recognize, however, that information quality comes at a
cost.").
178. See id. at 8453 (noting that "[i]t is important that these guidelines do not impose unnecessary
administrative burdens" on agencies).
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decision-making and accountability. 79 Such judicial review, however,
could unnecessarily frustrate other purposes of the PRA, such as
ensuring the greatest possible public benefit from information created,
used, or disseminated by or for the federal government.
180 Like the U.S.
Supreme Court's preclusion of consumer suits in Block, preclusion of
judicial review of RFC decisions would not threaten the goal of
improving the quality of federal information.18' In addition to the
statutorily granted administrative mechanisms in the IQA,182 Congress
has provided an opportunity, before a regulation becomes binding, for
affected persons to challenge information relied on by federal
agencies.1
83
The IQA's preference for administrative mechanisms is further
evidence of congressional intent to preclude judicial review of agency
RFC decisions. 184 Congress delegated to the OMB and federal agencies
the discretion to establish RFC administrative review mechanisms
85 and
define the key terms of the IQA. 186 The IQA provides that agencies will
determine what remedies are available to affected persons seeking
review187 and delegates discretion to the agencies in making such
179. See 44 U.S.C. § 3501(4) (2000) (stating that purpose of Paperwork Reduction Act is to
"improve the quality and use of Federal information to strengthen decision-making, accountability,
and openness in government and society"); see, e.g., REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE, supra note
5, at 3-6 (noting examples where Data Quality Act was successful in improving quality and
reliability of information disseminated by government).
180. See id. § 3501(2) (stating that purpose of Paperwork Reduction Act is to "ensure the greatest
possible public benefit from and maximize the utility of information created, collected, maintained,
used, shared and disseminated by or for the Federal Government"); see, e.g., MCGARITY ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 32 (noting that while it is "important for regulatory agencies to marshal the most
rigorous possible empirical evidence and scientific analysis, any regulatory decision ultimately
reflects certain ethical judgments, social priorities, and ... political values" because of inherent
limits of scientific knowledge).
181. See Information Quality Act § 515(a), 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 note (West Supp. 2004); 44
U.S.C. § 3501(4) (2000); Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1984); see, e.g.,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 30, 7 (reporting that OMB representatives
contemplated IQA procedures as complementary, not in lieu of, APA commenting procedures).
182. See Information Quality Act § 515(b)(2)(B), 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 note.
183. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2000) (describing notice and comment requirements of
rulemaking under APA).
184. See Block, 467 U.S. at 348 (stating that preference for administrative mechanisms is element
used to determine whether Congress intended to preclude judicial review).
185. See Information Quality Act § 515(b)(l)(B), 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 note.
186. See Information Quality Act § 515(a), 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 note (directing 0MB to establish
guidelines to ensure and maximize quality, objectivity, utility and integrity of information without
defining standards).
187. See OMB Guidelines; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8459 (Feb. 22, 2002) ("Agencies
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determinations.' 88
In sum, congressional intent to preclude judicial review is implicit in
the IQA's structure and objectives, and in the nature of administrative
action involved. In the absence of an express statement on judicial
review and with almost no legislative history, these three factors control
the determination of congressional intent to preclude judicial review.
Taken together, the factors demonstrate a "fairly discernible" intent to
preclude judicial review of an agency's RFC decisions.
B. Judicial Review of an Agency's Decision to Grant or Deny an RFC
Is Barred Under Section 701 (a)(2) of the APA Because the
Decision Is Committed to Agency Discretion by Law
Section 701(a)(2) bars judicial review of an agency's RFC decision
because neither the IQA nor the OMB Guidelines provide any law to
apply, or any meaningful standards by which to judge, agency
decisions. 189 Although the OMB Guidelines define the information
quality standards in the IQA with some detail, 190 the IQA and the OMB
Guidelines do not provide "clear and specific" directives to confine an
agency's decision to grant or deny an RFC. 191 The language guiding the
agency's decision to grant or deny an RFC in the OMB Guidelines is
similar to the language in Webster and Steenholdt, where the courts held
that the agency decision was committed to agency discretion by law. 192
The IQA and the OMB Guidelines do not provide any "law to apply"
or "judicially manageable standards" by which to judge an agency's
refusal to grant an RFC. 193 The OMB Guidelines state that "agencies
shall specify appropriate time periods for agency decisions on whether and how to correct the
information.").
188. See Information Quality Act § 515(b), 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 note.
189. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) (applying701(a)(2) exception where there is "no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's
exercise of discretion"); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)(applying 701 (a)(2) exception where there is "no law to apply").
190. See OMB Guidelines; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8453.
191. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411, 413 (noting that statutes at issue were "clear and
specific" directives not to use federal funds to construct highways through parks absent unusual
circumstances).
192. See OMB Guidelines; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8459 ("where appropriate"); Webster
v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 594 (1988) ("deem"); Steenholdt v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 314 F.3d 633, 638(D.C. Cir. 2003) ("considers appropriate").
193. See Information Quality Act § 515(b)(2)(A), 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 note; OMB Guidelines;
Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8459-60 ("Definitions").
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shall establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to
seek and obtain, where appropriate, timely correction of information
maintained and disseminated by the agency that does not comply with
OMB or agency guidelines."' 194 Further, the OMB Guidelines state that
"[t]he agency shall respond to complaints in a manner appropriate to the
nature and extent of the complaint."'195 The language "where
appropriate" in the OMB Guidelines regarding an agency's decision to
grant or deny an RFC parallels the "deem" language of section 102 of
the National Security Act at issue in Webster' 96 and the "considers
appropriate" language of section 44702(d)(2) of the FA Act at issue in
Steenholdt.197 In both Webster and Steenholdt, the courts found that the
agency decision was committed to agency discretion by law under the
section 701(a)(2) exception of the APA. 98 Even if an affected party
claims that information disseminated by a federal agency does not
comply with one of the IQA information quality standards (i.e.
objectivity, utility, or integrity), the OMB Guidelines require a decision
to grant an RFC only "where appropriate."' 199
Unlike the Federal-Aid Highway Act at issue in Overton Park, the
IQA and subsequent guidelines do not provide any "clear and specific
directives" on what agencies should consider when deciding whether it
would be appropriate to grant or deny an RFC or how to reach the goal
of ensuring and maximizing the quality of information disseminated by
the federal government. 20 The IQA requires only that the OMB and
federal agencies issue guidelines that ensure and maximize the quality of
government information. 20 1 In the IQA, Congress left it to the OMB and
federal agencies to define the key terms of the IQA--"quality,"
"objectivity," "utility," and "integrity. 2 °2 The OMB Guidelines define
194. See OMB Guidelines; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8459 (emphasis added).
195. See id. (emphasis added).
196. See Webster, 486 U.S. at 600.
197. See Steenholdt, 314 F.3d 633 at 638; see also Salt Inst. v. Thompson, 345 F. Supp. 2d 589,
602-03 (E.D. Va. 2004) (pointing out similar discretionary language in FA Act in Steenholdt and
IQA).
198. See Webster, 486 U.S. at 600-01; Steenholdt, 314 F.3d at 638.
199. See OMB Guidelines; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8459 (Feb. 22, 2002).
200. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971).
201. See Information Quality Act § 515(a), 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 note (West Supp. 2004).
202. See id. § 515(b)(2)(A), 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 note; OMB Guidelines; Republication, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 8459-60 ("Definitions").
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the substantive terms of the IQA with some detail,203 but the OMB
recognized the uncertainty of how the substantive terms would relate to
the "widely divergent types of information that agencies disseminate. 20 4
The language in the OMB Guidelines affords great discretion to
agencies' decisions to grant or deny an RFC.2°5 Unlike the FAHA and
the DTA in Overton Park, which barred the use of federal funds to
construct highways through parks absent unusual circumstances, 20 6 there
is no "plain and explicit" bar to when an agency can refuse to correct an
RFC. The OMB Guidelines call for "flexible" administrative
mechanisms and correction of information only "where appropriate. 20 7
IV. CONCLUSION
Judicial review of an agency's decision to grant or deny an RFC
under the APA is barred because such review falls within both section
701(a) exceptions to APA review. Under section 701(a)(1),
congressional intent to preclude judicial review of the IQA is "fairly
discernible" through the structure, objectives, and nature of
administrative action involved in the statutory scheme. Under section
701(a)(2), judicial review of the IQA is not available because the IQA
and its pursuant guidelines do not provide any law to apply, nor do they
provide any meaningful standards by which to judge agency action.
203. See OMB Guidelines; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8453.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 8459.
206. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,411 (1971).
207. See OMB Guidelines; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8459.
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